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FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND EXCULPATORY CLAUSES:
CLASH OF THE TITANS OR COZY BEDFELLOWS?
Louise Lark Hill*
Centuries ago, when land represented the majority of wealth, the trust was used
primarily for holding and transferring real property. As the dominant form of
wealth moved away from family land, the trust evolved into a device for managing
financial assets. With this transformation came the use of exculpatory clauses by
both amateur and professional trustees, providing an avenue for these fiduciaries
to escape liability for designated acts. With the use of exculpatory provisions, dis-
cussion abounded about whether fiduciary duties were mandatory or subject to
modification. The latter view eventually prevailed, with the majority ofjurisdic-
tions viewing fiduciary duties as default rules; that is, part of a private agreement
around which the parties are free to contract. Contracting around fiduciary duties
is of particular concern when a lawyer suggests himselffor a fiduciary role and in-
serts an exculpatory clause into the governing instrument. Although the lawyer is
subject to applicable legal ethics rules, such as those which govern communications
and conflicts of interest, this contractarian view of the attorney-client relationship
is less than ideal, especially when lawyers and non-lawyer professionals are in-
volved in a reciprocal referral agreement. During the recent revisions to the UPC,
mandates relating to the default nature of fiduciary duties were not addressed.
Perhaps this was because the matter was outside the scope of the revisionists' re-
view, or perhaps the drafters of the revisions were comfortable with the recent
position the Uniform 7ust Code and the Restatement of 7usts have taken on ex-
culpatory clauses. However the UPC revisions should have addressed this matter
with specificity. Given public policy concerns, client protection, fiduciary responsi-
bilities, and the professional responsibility of lawyers, it may be that the standard
of prudence should not be abandoned so easily.
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Probate Code calls for trustees to observe the
standards in dealing with "trust assets that would be observed by a
prudent man dealing with the property of another."' It further
notes that with respect to the probate of wills and administration of
estates, the personal representative "is a fiduciary who shall observe
the standard of care applicable to trustees as described by Section
Distinguished Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law
1. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-302 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 507 (1998); see infra notes
73-79 and accompanying text (prudent investor rule has replaced prudent man rule in the
United States).
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7-302," and "is liable to interested persons for damage or loss re-
sulting from breach of his fiduciary duty to the same extent as a
trustee of an express trust." There is, however, qualifying language
attached to this standard of care: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by the terms of the trust."'
By calling for liability for breach of fiduciary duty to mirror that
of a trustee of an express trust, the Uniform Probate Code incor-
porates common law concerning trustee liability, as well as
statutory law. Of late, considerable attention has been devoted to
the status of fiduciary duties and, in particular, whether these du-
ties are mandatory or can be changed by agreement." Part of this
discussion concerns the genesis of trusts and whether trusts are
grounded in contract law or property law."
The first part of this Article will explore the evolution of the
trust, and address the use of exculpation to modify the duties of
trustees. Next, the Article will examine the default nature of fidu-
ciary duties, and highlight the positions taken by the Uniform
Trust Code and the Restatement of Trusts on exculpatory clauses.
The second part of the Article will address standards of care associ-
ated with fiduciaries, focusing on the lawyer as fiduciary, and will
discuss the propriety of using exculpatory clauses with professional
trustees. Given the importance of this issue, the Article takes the
position that the revisions to the Uniform Probate Code should
have addressed exculpatory clauses rather than leaving the matter
to other law.
I. EVOLUTION OF TRUSTS
Centuries ago, when land represented the majority of wealth,
the trust primarily was used for holding and transferring real
2. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703(a) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 138 (1998).
3. § 3-712 8,8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 160.
4. § 7-302, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 507.
5. Compare Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L. J. 879 (1988) (fiduciary duties have a mandatory core), and Melvin Aron Ei-
senberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211 (1995)
(cognition justifies the imposition of certain mandatory fiduciary duties), with John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995) (the duty of
loyalty is default law that yields to the terms of the trust deal), and Robert H. Sitkoff, An
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2004) (fiduciary rules imposed by
trust law are majoritarian default rules).
6. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 628.
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property within families. Trustees were usually family members or
friends of the settlor who served gratuitously." Typically, the settlor
conveyed land to the trustee, who held the land for the settlor dur-
ing his life, and upon the settlor's death, conveyed it to selected
family members as remainder beneficiaries.9 The trust was "primar-
ily a branch of the law of conveyancing" and "[w]as a means of
transferring and holding title to real estate."0
Over time, as the dominant form of wealth moved away from
family real estate, the trust evolved from a conveyance device to "a
management device for holding financial assets."" These financial
assets were often complex, requiring "active and specialized man-
agement, in contrast to the conveyance trust that merely held
ancestral land.",2 With this shift in trust property came a different
type of trustee. Although "unpaid amateurs" were still around, "the
fee-paid professional" became the prototypical trustee.1'
7. SeeJohn H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best In-
terest1, 14 YALE L.J. 929, 940 (2005).
8. See id. at 939. Trustees served gratuitously in England, for " 'a conflict of duty'
would arise 'if the trustee were allowed to perform the duties of the office and to claim re-
muneration for his services,' because the trustee's 'interest would be opposed to his duty to'
the beneficiaries." Id. at 939-40 (quoting JOHN MOWBRAY ET AL., LEWIN ON TRUSTS § 20-
132, at 503 (17th ed. 2000)). According to Langbein, Chantal Stebbings believes that "the
use of lawyer-trustees increased in late Victorian times and ... they began inserting compen-
sation clauses into the trust instruments they drafted." Langbein, supra note 7, at 940 n.43
(citing CHANTAL STEBBINGS, THE PRIVATE TRUSTEE IN VIcTORIAN ENGLAND 34-36 (2002)).
9. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 633. Hansmann & Mattei have described a "prototyp-
ical Anglo-American trust":
[T]hree parties are involved: the "settlor" transfers property to the "trustee," who is
charged with the duty to administer the property for the benefit of the "beneficiary."
Any of these three roles may be played by more than one person. Also, the same per-
son may play more than one of the three roles. In particular, the settlor and the
beneficiary may be the same person.
Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434,438 (1998).
10. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 633.
11. Id. at 637. "As Langbein and others have demonstrated, the private trust has
evolved from a vehicle for conveying and preserving ancestral land into an organizing device
that allows owners of property to ensure the ongoing and intergenerational professional
management of their wealth." Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 633. Typically, the modern trust holds
a portfolio of "complex financial assets, which are contract rights against the issuers." See
Langbein, supra note 5, at 638. Examples of these would be "stocks, bonds, mutual fund
shares, insurance and annuity contracts, pension plans, and bank deposits." See id.
12. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 638.
13. See id. When trust property became "a portfolio of financial assets, the advantages
of using skilled professionals came to outweigh the disadvantages of having to compensate
them." Langbein, supra note 7, at 941. This new trustee was seen by some as "a service pro-
vider for hire, hardly different in function from the professionals who contract to supply
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A. Duties of the Trustee
It is elementary trust law that a trustee must have duties to per-
form. 4  Without enforceable duties, the beneficiary has no
enforceable interest, which makes the trust illusory.5 The standard
of care initially applied to the professional trustee was the standard
of the reasonable professional.'6 It came to be recognized that "[a]
trustee who has special skills or expertise, or is named trustee in
reliance upon the trustee's representation that the trustee has spe-
cial skills or expertise, has a duty to use those special skills or
expertise.""
The core fiduciary duties generally recognized with trusts are
those of loyalty, impartiality, and the duty of prudence in the con-
duct of trust administration. The duty of loyalty-to administer the
trust solely in the beneficiaries' interest'"-has been described as
the "most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiar-
ies."'9 The duty of impartiality requires the trustee to give due
regard to the interests of all the beneficiaries of a trust.20 The duty
of prudence in the conduct of trust administration requires the
exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution.'
services in industry, commerce, finance, law, accounting and so forth." Langbein, supra note
5, at 644.
14. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(4) (2010). When condemning a trust term that
shielded trustee decisions from court review, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that "[a]
trust in which there is no legally binding obligation on a trustee is a trust in name only and
more in the nature of an absolute estate or fee simple grant of property." McNeil v. McNeil,
798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002).
15. SeeJohn H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Tusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1105,
1122 (2004).
16. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 639-40.
17. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(f) (1994), 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006) (derived from
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-302 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 507 (1990)).
18. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2010). The duty of loyalty "consists of a straightfor-
ward promise on the part of the [trustee] not to engage in self-interested transactions
involving the trust property." Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 9, at 448.
19. 2A AUSTIN W. Scorr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170, at 311
(4th ed. 1987). "[A] lawyer becomes a fiduciary once a representation begins," and "the duty
of loyalty exists only with respect to actions within the scope of the representation." Lynn A.
Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833,
1838-39 (2011).
20. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 (2010). Some view the duty of impartiality as part of
the duty of loyalty, rather than as a separate component of fiduciary law. See Langbein, supra
note 5, at 656 n.162.
21. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 (2010). An objective standard of care puts the trustee
"under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as a
man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). The UTC "bases the standard on the purposes and other
circumstances of the particular trust." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 cmt. (2010). The prudence
Fiduciary Duties and Exculpatory Clauses
Over time, as the trust evolved from a mechanism for holding
real property to a device for managing assets, some trust instru-
ments began to contain exculpatory clauses by which trustees
could escape liability for certain acts. For instance, many trusts in-
cluded provisions that "immunize [d] the trustee from liability to
the beneficiaries absent something beyond 'ordinary' negligence
or breach of fiduciary duty."22
B. Enforceability of Exculpatory Provisions
In the early twentieth century, it was unclear whether trustees
could escape liability through the use of exculpatory provisions in
trust instruments. 23 Some courts found trustees liable by construing
these clauses narrowly.24 Courts in other jurisdictions found such
clauses to be "unenforceable as against public policy."25 Still other
courts readily invoked exculpatory clauses, resulting in trustees be-
ing shielded from liability for negligent acts.2"'
For the amateur trustee, exculpatory clauses were used to
protect the named friend or family member. Settlors often chose
non-professional trustees because settlors placed high value "on
qualities other than professional trust management, such as the
trustee's knowledge of family dynamics or the beneficiaries' pecu-
liarities."2 If such a trustee lacked expertise in financial matters, a
settlor might want to absolve the trustee from investment decision
standard for investing and managing assets is found in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 90 (2007).
22. Kevin J. Parker, Trustee Defenses: Statute of Limitations, Laches, Self-Executing Account-
ing Release Provisions, and Exculpatory Clauses, 23 PROB. & PROP., at 53, 53, 55 (2009).
23. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules,
94 CEO. L. J. 67, 75 n.43 (2006) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 reporter
notes (1959)).
24. Id.
25. Parker, supra note 22, at 55.
26. In Warren v. Pazolt, the testator's will provided for trustee liability "only for his own
'willful defaults' and that they shall not 'be answerable for any loss or damage which may
happen to the trust property without their respective willful neglect or default.' " Warren v.
Pazolt, 89 N.E. 381, 388, 390 (Mass. 1909). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ex-
plained that "[w]illful default means intentionally making away with the trust property and a
willful neglect means such reckless indifference to true interests of the trust as to amount to
or partake of a willful violation of duty." Id. at 388. When the trustees, in "error," bought
additional land and erected a building, rather than selling the existing land, they therefore
were not guilty of "willful neglect or default." Id. But see Leslie, supra note 23, at 74-75 (not-
ing that some scholars assert that courts routinely enforce exculpatory clauses but suggesting
that case law does not support this conclusion).
27. Leslie, supra note 23, at 101.
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errors, hoping this protection might make the potential trustee
more likely to serve." For the family member or friend, there was a
rational basis for an exculpatory clause that protected them from
liability or induced them to take on a responsibility. Such a rational
basis was less clear, however, when the trustees were professionals
and hired for their professional expertise, for which compensation
was received. Some felt that
[a] trust provision reducing fiduciary duties or exculpating
the trustee is inconsistent with the essence of the relationship,
which is the trustee's explicit or implicit promise to exercise
the highest degree of care and skill, and to devote its energies
to advancing zealously the beneficiaries' and not the trustee's
interests. 29
Nonetheless, exculpatory clauses were widely used in wills and
trust instruments for both amateur and professional trustees." Ex-
culpatory clauses, in "countless cases," "relieved trustees of liability
for conduct that would otherwise have given rise to surcharges.""
Although exculpatory clauses were widely used, some scholars
found there was little justification for allowing professional trustees
to use broad exculpatory clauses for protection.32 For instance, it
was noted:
The ethics of the demand by corporate trustees for the inser-
tion of an exculpatory clause seems dubious, to say the least.
After advertising great skill and ability, and impliedly promis-
ing to use all that care and capacity in any trust where it is
chosen trustee, the bank or trust company should not insist
28. See id. ("Both settlor and trustee might want an exculpatory clause to give the trus-
tee some room to maneuver without fear of liability.").
29. Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and Trustee Identi-
ty, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 2713, 2715 (2006) (footnote omitted). Professor Leslie advocates for
different standards for the professional and non-professional trustee. See id. at 2720.
30. See 4 AuSTIN W. ScoTT, WILLIAM F. FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, ScoTT AND
ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 24.27, at 1799 (5th ed. 2007).
31. Id. (footnote omitted).
32. Leslie, supra note 23, at 101. One commentator has asserted that "most well-
established institutional trustees do not feel the need for broad clauses and do not insist on
them." Id. The "increasing practice of testamentary draftsmen and corporate fiduciaries in
vesting in testamentary fiduciaries almost unlimited powers, with a minimum of obligations,"
however, led to a New York statute that invalidated exculpatory provisions on grounds of
public policy. The statute released a fiduciary from liability for failure to exercise reasonable
care, diligence, or prudence. Peter C. Valente & Joann T. Palumbo, Exculpatory Provisions,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 29,1998, at 3 (quoting 4TH REP., TEMP. COMM'N ON ESTATEs 499 (1965)).
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that the [settlor] hold the trustee to a lower standard of per-
formance.33
Some jurisdictions condemned the use of exculpatory clauses on
policy grounds. For instance, in 1936, a New York statute provided
that an attempted grant of immunity from liability to an executor
or trustee for failure to exercise reasonable care, diligence, and
prudence was contrary to public policy.3 4 While settlors did not
universally embrace exculpatory clauses, generally an exculpatory
clause was considered "effective to limit the trustee's liability," and
"not against public policy if it merely relieve[d] the trustee of lia-
bility for ordinary negligence.
C. Fiduciary Duties: Default Provisions or Immutable Rules?
As scholars discussed whether fiduciary duties are mandatory, or
if they are subject to modification, at issue was whether trusts are
grounded in contract law or property law." Those who viewed
trusts as contracts posited that voluntary bargaining, including the
ability to modify trustee duties, was part of trust formation. In es-
sence, fiduciary duties were default rules; that is, part of a private
agreement that the parties were free to contract around." Those
who viewed trusts as based on property law considered fiduciary
duties to be a defining aspect of trusts, and disapproved of at-
tempts to waive or significantly modify their application.3" This
33. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 340 (6th ed. 1987).
34. Estate Powers and Trusts Law § 11-1.7 was renumbered and amended in 1967 to
insert the word "testamentary" to modify the word "trustee." N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 11-1.7 historical & statutory notes (McKinney 2008). In the 2008 Surrogates Court,
New York County, New York, this public policy mandate was found to apply equally to an
inter vivos trust where, by its terms, no one was in a position to protect the beneficiaries
from the actions of the trustee. In re Shore, 854 N.Y.S. 2d 293, 296 (2008).
35. See ScoTr, FRATCHER & ASHER, supra note 30, at 1799-1801 (footnotes omitted).
Exculpatory clauses may fail to limit the trustee's liability "either (1) because the trustee
commits a breach of trust that does not fall within the scope of the provision; (2) because
the provision is against public policy; or (3) because the provision was improperly included
in the trust instrument." Id. at 1799.
36. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 628.
37. See id. at 657-61.
38. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
39. See Bogert, supra note 33, at 340. Exculpatory provisions must be distinguished
from clauses that expand a fiduciary's powers. For instance, a provision stating a trustee is
not liable for breach of fiduciary duty because of investment decisions is different from a
provision authorizing a trustee to make improper investments. See Valente & Palumbo, supra
note 32, at 3.
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century-old argument of whether trusts are based on contract law
or property law has resurfaced of late. 0 Some say "the deal between
settlor and trustee is functionally indistinguishable from the mod-
ern third-party-beneficiary contract."41 Others, while recognizing
that the transaction between a settlor and trustee is contract-based,
note that it is "the property-like aspects of the trust that are the
principal contribution of trust law."42 Still others view the law in this
area as "organizational law," because it "blends features familiar
from both property and contract law" that are the proprietary in-
gredients of identified property (the trust res) and the in
personam contractarian elements.4 3 An underlying component of
the contractarian analysis, however, is the assumption "that the par-
ties to the deal have full information and equal bargaining
power."4 4 Even those who embrace trusts as grounded in contract
law and view fiduciary duties as waivable recognize there are limits
on this practice.4 ' For instance, John Langbein, who views fiduciary
duties as default rules, recognizes there are some duties that can-
not be waived. He posits that inclusion of terms that would waive
the duty of loyalty or a trustee's duty to act in good faith would in-
dicate the settlor did not understand the instrument, because no
informed settlor would knowingly agree to such provisions.4 r
Mandatory rules, often referred to as "immutable rules," are dis-
tinguished from default rules in contractarian economics.4
According to contract theorists, default rules promote efficiency by
minimizing transaction costs. 8 Theorists recognize that
40. See supra note 5.
41. Langbein, supra note 5, at 627.
42. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 9, at 469.
43. Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 627. "The trust is more than a simple contract between pri-
vate parties. It is an organizational form with in rem as well as in personam dimensions." Id.
at 638.
44. Leslie, supra note 23, at 81 (footnote omitted).
45. See Leslie, supra note 29, at 2742. The Uniform Trust Code provides that "[elven if
the terms of the trust attempt to completely exculpate a trustee for the trustee's acts, the
trustee must always comply with a certain minimum standard." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008
cmt. (2010).
46. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1124. As with trust law, in some areas of corporate
law, "ex-ante contracts have been allowed to trump fiduciary duty." Richard W. Painter,
Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHIcs 289, 291 (2000). Also, as with trust law,
to this "there are limits." Id.
47. See id. at 289.
48. See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context,
73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1037 (2005). But "[i]t is a credo of estate planning that a well-
drafted will should anticipate contingencies and never rely on default rules." Id. at 1039
(footnote omitted).
836 [VOL. 45:4
SUMMER 2012] Fiduciary Duties and Exculpatory Clauses
an immutable rule is a rule that cannot be changed by a contrac-
tual agreement. A majoritarian immutable rule is suitable for
most parties in most situations, whereas a tailored immutable
rule is designed for a specific subset of parties. A default rule,
unlike an immutable rule, can be changed by a contractual ar-
rangement."
The Uniform Trust Code views fiduciary duties as both default
rules and as immutable rules that are majoritarian.o
D. Position of the Uniform Trust Code on Exculpatory Clauses
The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) is part of a coordinated law re-
vision project put forth in 2000, described as "the first
comprehensive national codification of the American law of
trusts."0' The UTC essentially provides that trust law is default law,
except for specifically scheduled mandatory rules. 2 Among the
mandatory rules is "the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust."5 3 The manda-
tory rules provide further that "a trust and its terms be for the
benefit of its beneficiaries.",4 Interestingly, the core duties of
49. Painter, supra note 46, at 289-90 (footnote omitted). Majoritarian default rules,
tailored default rules, and penalty default rules are the three primary types of default rules:
A majontarian default rule is a rule that most contracting parties prefer. Other parties
bargain around the default or, if bargaining costs are too high, live with the default
rule even though for them it is suboptimal. Majoritarian rules save transaction costs
because most parties have no incentive to contract around the default. Tailored default
rules are majoritarian default rules that are designed for specific subgroups of con-
tracting parties. A penalty default rule is a rule most parties would not prefer, but which
is imposed to induce parties to contract for their own tailored rule.
Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
50. See infra note 54.
51. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1106. The UTC was prepared in coordination with the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which was published in part in final form in 2003. Id. at
1106-07. Section 27 of the Restatement requires that "a private trust, its terms, and its ad-
ministration must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 27 (2003).
52. Section 105(a) of the UTC provides that all trust law is default law except for the
mandatory rules specifically stated in Section 105(b). See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a)-(b)
(2010).
53. § 105(b)(2) (emphasis added).
54. § 105(b)(3). Section 105 of the UTC, entitled "Default and Mandatory Rules,"
provides:
837
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loyalty, impartiality, and prudence are not on the UTC's list of
mandatory rules. This has led to the interpretation that "[t]rust
law allows the settlor to conclude that particular fiduciary rules
would overprotect or otherwise complicate the particular trust and
its purposes, hence, the beneficiaries would be better served by
abridging them.",6
(a) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this [Code] gov-
erns the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and
the rights and interests of a beneficiary.
(b) The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this [Code] except:
(1) the requirements for creating a trust;
(2) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance
with the terts and purposes of the trust and the interest of the
beneficiaries;
(3) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries, and that the trust have a purpose that is lawful, not
contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve;
(4) the power of the court to modify or terminate a trust under Sec-
tions 410 through 416;
(5) the effect of a spendthrift provision and the rights of certain
creditors and assignees to reach a trust as provided in [Article]
5;
(6) the power of the court under Section 702 to require, dispense
with, or modify or terminate a bond;
(7) the power of the court under Section 708(b) to adjust a trustee's
compensation specified in the terms of the trust which is unrea-
sonably low or high;
(8) the duty under Section 813(b) (2) and (3) to notify the qualified
beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who have attained 25 years
of age of the existence of the trust, of the identity of the trustee,
and of their right to request trustee's reports;
(9) the duty under Section 813(a) to respond to the request of a
[qualified] beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for trustee's reports
and other information reasonably related to the administration
of the trust;
(10) the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 1008;
(11) the rights under Section 1010 through 1013 of a person other
than a trustee or beneficiary;
(12) periods of limitation for commencing a judicial proceeding;
[and]
(13) the power of the court to take such action and exercise such ju-
risdiction as may be necessary in the interests ofjustice; [and]
(14) the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and venue for com-
mencing a proceeding as provided in Sections 203 and 204].
§ 105(a)-(b) (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
55. See§ 105(b).
56. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1122.
Fiduciary Duties and Exculpatory Clauses
The UTC recognizes exculpatory clauses as generally enforcea-
ble. However, there are substantive limitations to using exculpatory
clause in that a trustee cannot be relieved from bad faith, inten-
tional misconduct, or reckless indifference. The UTC provides:
(a) A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for
breach of trust is unenforceable to the extent that
it:
(1) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of
trust committed in bad faith or with reckless
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the
interests of the beneficiaries; or
(2) was inserted as the result of an abuse by the
trustee of a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship to the settlor.
(b) An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be draft-
ed by the trustee is invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary
or confidential relationship unless the trustee
proves that the exculpatory term is fair under the
circumstances and that its existence and contents
were adequately communicated to the settlor.
Kevin Parker notes that this UTC section "would allow a trustee to
retain a profit that the trustee made from the trust even though
the profit was derived from a breach of trust, as long as such
breach did not arise to the level of one of the exceptions (bad faith
or reckless indifference) ." And commentary to the UTC states
that the trustee's burden with respect to fairness and communica-
tion is satisfied if independent counsel represented the settlor."
This is the case even if the settlor's attorney uses the trustee's
form.60
E. Position of the Restatement of Trusts on Exculpatory Clauses
The Restatement of Trusts (Restatement) also addresses the
matter of exculpatory clauses and is similar to the UTC provisions,
57. UNIw. TRUST CODE § 1008 (2010).
58. Parker, supra note 22, at 57.
59. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 cmt. (2010). Commentary to section 1008 specifically re-
jects the position taken by the court in Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991), which placed the burden on the beneficiary to prove an exculpatory clause was in-
serted as a result of an abuse of a fiduciary relationship. See id.
60. Id.
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although there are differences. Both the UTC and the Restatement
provide that exculpatory clauses generally are enforceable.6 ' Both
state that such clauses are unenforceable if inserting the clause in-
to the instrument was itself a breach of fiduciary duty.6 2 And both
also provide that exculpatory clauses are to be strictly construed
and establish substantive limitations precluding protection from
bad faith, intentional misconduct, or reckless indifference.62 Inter-
estingly, the 2009 Tentative Draft to the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts, which has been approved and is scheduled to be incorpo-
rated in the Restatement (Third)'s fourth volume expected in
2012, would remove the word "reckless" and broaden unenforcea-
bility to "indifference to the fiduciary duties of the trustee, the
terms and purposes of the trust, or the interest of the beneficiar-
ies.""4 Another difference is that under the Restatement, in contrast
to the UTC, a trustee who is relieved of liability for breach of trust
by virtue of exculpatory clause protection must disgorge profits
derived from the breach of trust.6" Both the Restatement and UTC
61. Section 222(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides that "[e]xcept as
stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the trustee, by provisions in the terms of the trust, can be
relieved of liability for breach of trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(1) (1959).
62. See id. Section 222(3) provides:
To the extent to which a provision relieving the trustee of liability from breaches of
trust is inserted in the trust instrument as a result of an abuse by the trustee of a fidu-
ciary or confidential relationship to the settlor, such provision is ineffective.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(3). The Tentative Draft No. 5 of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts § 96(1) provides:
A provision in the terms of a trust that relieves a trustee of liability for breach of trust,
and that was not included in the instrument as a result of the trustee's abuse of a fi-
duciary or confidential relationship, is enforceable except to the extent that it
purports to relieve the trustee
(a) of liability for a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with indiffer-
ence to the fiduciary duties of the trustee, the terms or purposes of the
trust, or the interests of the beneficiaries, or
(b) of accountability for profits derived from a breach of trust.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96(1) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96(1) (a) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 243 cmt. g. Section 243 comment g provides:
Exculpatory provisions. A trustee may be denied compensation, wholly or partially, on
account of a breach of trust committed by him, even though he does not incur a lia-
bility for the breach of trust because of an exculpatory provision in the trust
instrument.
Fiduciary Duties and Exculpatory Clauses
have similar clauses regarding the insertion of an exculpatory
clause as a result of abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confiden-
tial relationship. But only the UTC places the burden on the
trustee who drafted the clause, or caused the clause to be drafted,
to prove the clause is fair and was adequately communicated to the
settlor." It should be noted that the 2009 Tentative Draft would
also place the burden on the trustee to prove such a clause is fair
and adequately communicated or understood by the settlor,67
although there is no indication in the Restatement whether this
burden is satisfied if the settlor is represented by independent
counsel.
To determine when an exculpatory clause is included in an in-
strument as a result of an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship, one may consider, among other factors:
whether the instrument was drawn by the trustee or another
acting wholly or in part on behalf of the trustee; whether the
trustee prior to or at the time of the trust's creation had been
in a fiduciary relationship to the settlor, such as by serving as
the settlor's conservator or as the settlor's lawyer in providing
the trust instrument or relevant part(s) of it; whether the set-
tlor received competent, independent advice regarding the
provisions of the instrument; whether the settlor was made
aware of the exculpatory provision and was, with whatever
guidance may have been provided, able to understand and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 243 cmt. g. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 96(1)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
66. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
67. Comment d to the Tentative Draft No. 5 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts pro-
vides, in part:
Clause improperly included in terms of trust. If the terms of the trust were drafted by the
trustee, or if the exculpatory clause was caused to be included in the trust by the trus-
tee, the clause is presumptively unenforceable. The presumption is rebuttable, and
the clause will be given effect if the trustee proves that the exculpatory provision is
fair under the circumstances (including, when applicable, the fiduciary risks to be as-
sumed) and that the existence, contents, and effect of the clause were adequately
communicated to or otherwise understood by the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009) (citations omit-
ted).
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make a judgment concerning the clause; and the extent and
reasonableness of the provision."
The commentary to the Restatement further provides that "an ex-
culpatory clause is unenforceable if it is found, by presumption or
otherwise, to be the product of undue influence or other improper
conduct on the part of the trustee."" And if the inclusion of an
exculpatory clause is the result of a mistake, "the terms of the trust
are subject to reformation."70 The commentary also cautions that
exculpatory clauses are to be distinguished from trust provi-
sions that modify a trustee's powers and duties; modifications
may affect the question of whether certain conduct by the
trustee constitutes a breach of trust, whereas an exculpatory
clause may eliminate or limit the trustee's liability when a
71breach of trust does occur.
Additionally, "[a]n exculpatory clause must be distinguished from
a clause that expands a fiduciary's powers," which gives a trustee
"power to do certain acts rather than give a blanket exoneration
for self-dealing and [what would be] other breaches of trust."02
II. STANDARDS OF CARE AND FIDUCIARIES
When dealing with trust assets, the UPC calls for trustees to ob-
serve the standards that would be observed by a prudent man
dealing with another's property. If the trustee happens to be a law-
yer, the trustee is also governed by applicable rules of professional
68. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts looked to the following factors
when determining whether an exculpatory clause was the result of an abuse by the trustee of
a fiduciary or confidential relationship:
(1) whether prior to the creation of the trust, the trustee was in a fiduciary relation-
ship with the settlor; (2) whether the trust was drawn by the trustee; (3) whether the
settlor had independent advice as to the trust provisions; (4) whether the settlor is a
person of experience and judgment or a person unfamiliar with business affairs; (5)
whether the insertion was a product of undue influence or improper conduct by the
trustee; (6) the extent and reasonableness of the provision.
Rutanen v. Ballard, 678 N.E.2d 113, 141 (Mass. 1997) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 222 cmt. d (1959)).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
70. Id.
71. Id. cmt. a.
72. Valente & Palumbo, supra note 32, at 3.
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conduct that have been adopted in designated jurisdictions. The
prudent man rule, recognized across the United States for years,
favored risk-adverse safe investments, such as government bonds
and disfavored those considered speculative, such as stocks.7 3 Each
investment was considered and evaluated in isolation, rather than
within the context of the entire portfolio.74 However, in the last two
decades, all states have replaced the prudent man rule with a new
prudent investor rule, directing the trustee to invest on the basis of
"risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust," with the
prudence of individual investments considered in the context of
the entire trust portfolio, not in isolation." "Assessing the pru-
dence of a particular investment therefore requires consideration
of the portfolio as a whole, the beneficiary's tolerance for risk, and
the purpose of the trust." Referred to as "[p] robably the most sig-
nificant and pervasive influence on fiduciary standards in this
country" in recent years, the prudent investor rule originated in a
special volume of the Restatement (Third) project and was then set
out in a uniform act." Some scholars questioned why it took so
long to shift from the concept of the prudent man to the
prudent investor rule. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff suggested that the
prudent man rule lasted as long as it did "because sophisticated
parties could opt out of its application." 7 8 The new rule, like the old
rule, "is nominally a default rule that may be altered by the terms
of the trust."70
Today, most states approach exculpatory clauses in trust instru-
ments in one of three ways. States tend to follow the Restatement
principles or the UTC, or implement statutes nullifying exculpatory
73. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Invest-
ment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation , 50 J.L. & ECON 681, 681-82 (2007).
74. See id. at 682.
75. Id. The new prudent investor rule provides that the "trustee's investment and
management decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in
the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy
having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust." UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR
ACT § 2 (1994), 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2005).
76. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 73, at 685.
77. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law
at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1918 (2000). One commentator referred to the 1990s
as "the decade of trust reform," because it featured creation of "the Restatement of Trusts in
1992, followed by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act in 1994, and the Uniform Principal and
Income Act in 1997," which together "mark[ed] the formal entrance of Modern Portfolio
Theory into trust law." Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New
Millennium, or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REv. 543, 567-68 (1999)
(footnotes omitted).
78. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 73, at 687 (citations omitted).
79. See id. (citations omitted).
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clauses based on public policy concerns.so A matter of particular
concern to this author, however, is the situation where a lawyer
names himself, his firm, or an institution with which he works, to a
fiduciary position, and includes an exculpatory provision within
the governing instrument.
A. The Lawyer as Fiduciary
In the not too distant past, a lawyer attempting to influence a
client to name him as an executor or trustee was frowned upon. An
Ethical Consideration in the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility stated that "[a] lawyer should not consciously influence a
client to name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument.
In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such,
care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.""'
Lawyers were not to suggest themselves for fiduciary roles, let
alone use language in an instrument that would excuse them from
liability for breach of trust. With the advent of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1983," however, this prohibition against a
lawyer influencing a client to name the lawyer to a fiduciary
position was not reasserted. To that end, the Rules provided the
following explanation when addressing the legal background of
new Model Rule 1.8 on Conflict of Interest:
80. Parker, supra note 22, at 55.
81. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6 (1983). The Canons of Profession-
al Ethics (Canons), originally promulgated in 1908 and replaced by the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Model Code), did not prohibit the practice of lawyers serving as
executors. See Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary
Roles: Policy and Ethical Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1357, 1376 (1994). The Model
Code replaced the Canons in 1969 because, in part, "a consensus developed among the bar
that the Canons were incomplete, unorganized, and failed to 'recognize the distinction
between the inspirational and proscriptive.' " Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Communications on the
Internet: Beginning the Millennium with Disparate Standards, 75 WASH. L. REv. 785, 792 (2000)
(quoting Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24
ARK. L. REv. 1, 5 (1970)). "The Model Code [was] composed of three parts: (1) Canons-
concise statements setting forth the basic duties of lawyers[;] (2) Ethical Considerations-
statements of activity and conduct to which practitioners should aspire[;] and (3) Discipli-
nary Rules-statements setting forth minimum standards of conduct that must be met." Hill,
supra, at 792 n.40 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY (Preliminary Draft 1969)).
82. The ABA, in 1983, "replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules). The movement that led to the Model Code's replacement began in
the 1970s, when members of the bar contended that the tripartite structure of the Model
Code was confusing." Hill, supra note 81, at 802 (footnotes omitted).
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EC 5-6 of the Code states that a lawyer should not seek to have
himself or a partner or associate named in an instrument as
executor of the client's estate. Such an appointment is not
expressly prohibited under this Rule, but is subject to the
general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 and the more
specific requirements of paragraph (a) of this Rule.13
Even before the promulgation of the Model Rules, it was gener-
ally felt that as long as the idea of the lawyer as fiduciary originated
with the client, there was little that was objectionable to a lawyer
814
assuming this role. This premise had its skeptics, however, for it
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8, legal background (Proposed Final Draft
1981) (citations omitted). Model Rule 1.8(a) provided:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuni-
ary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the in-
terest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner that can be
reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (1983). Model Rule 1.7 provided as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another cli-
ent or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consulta-
tion shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
Id. R. 1.7.
84. See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is
Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 98 (1984). Professor Johnston put forth rea-
sons why a client might want a lawyer to serve as an executor and why a lawyer would be
interested in assuming this role:
An attorney might be motivated to serve in this capacity to accommodate the client.
This could be the case, for example, when the provisions of the will vest considerable
discretion in the executor, and for this reason the testator would prefer not to
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was noted that it was "unusual for a client to ask an attorney to
serve in such a fiduciary capacity, unless the seeds of that 'request'
were planted by the attorney draftsman."a With the client likely to
be dead when the issue arises, "it is often the attorney's testimony
alone that may be the only evidence" of such an arrangement."
When the Model Rules did not address the propriety of suggesting
oneself as a fiduciary, let alone condemn the practice, some were
disappointed, expressing the opinion that preparation of a will
naming the draftsman as attorney "should be considered unethical
and subject to disciplinary sanctions."87 Johnston noted that
"[a]lthough an attorney's action in designating himself or herself
as a fiduciary may violate some of the more general ethical rules,
such as those pertaining to conflict of interest, it would have been
infinitely better if the new code had expressly forbidden this con-
duct," which, of course, the Model Rules did not.m
As the twenty-first century approached, the Model Rules under-
went significant scrutiny and subsequent revision.! The Model
Rules affirmatively recognized the position of the lawyer in a fidu-
ciary role.o The commentary to Model Rule 1.8 was revised to
appoint a corporate fiduciary, and feels that friends or relatives would not be appro-
priate persons to serve in this capacity. Alternatively, the attorney, having rendered
legal services to the testator in the past, may have become familiar with the testator's
family, assets, or business interests, and therefore might be the logical choice to look
after these matters once the testator has died . . . . Furthermore ... (it] can be lucra-
tive.
Id. at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
85. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 112. Apparently, an early draft of the Model Rules contained a note in the
commentary that echoed the premise of EC 5-6, stating that a lawyer should not "seek" to
have himself named as an executor in an instrument. This, however, was not included in the
Model Rules' final version. SeeSpurgeon & Ciccarello, supra note 81, at 1377.
88. SeeJohnston, supra note 84, at 98 (footnote omitted). It was noted that:
The newly adopted Model Rules of Professional Conduct are considerably less specif-
ic with regard to the potential impropriety of an attorney preparing a will in which he
or she is designated as executor .... [T]he Model Rules of Professional Conduct fall
far short of the Code of Professional Responsibility, because specific rules provide
more effective guidelines for lawyers seeking to act within ethical bounds.
Id. at 91 (footnotes omitted).
89. In 1997, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(Ethics 2000) was established to study and evaluate the Model Rules. It recommended
changes to over two-thirds of the existing Model Rules, and suggested that several new rules
be added. See Louise L. Hill, Electronic Communications and the 2002 Revisions to the Model Rules,
16 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 529, 531-32 (2002).
90. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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include language that "there is nothing improper about a lawyer
suggesting to a client that he, or someone in his firm, be named to
a lucrative fiduciary position."'
In a 2002 American Bar Association Formal Opinion which ad-
dressed a lawyer serving as fiduciary for an estate or trust, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
stated that a "lawyer may serve as a fiduciary under a will or trust
that the lawyer is preparing for the client."2 Such a role was sub-
ject, however, to satisfying the obligations under Model Rule
1.4(b)" and 1.7(b), 4 which address communication and conflict of
interest, respectively." Under Model Rule 1.4(b), the lawyer's role
as fiduciary must be explained to the client so the client can make
an informed decision about the representation." The ABA Opin-
ion indicated this would require a lawyer to
discuss frankly with the client her options in selecting an indi-
vidual to serve as fiduciary. This discussion should cover
information reasonably adequate to permit the client to un-
derstand the tasks to be performed by the fiduciary; the
fiduciary's desired skills; the kinds of individuals or entities
likely to serve most effectively, such as professionals, corporate
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 8 (2010). Noting that such an ap-
pointment will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision of Model Rule 1.7, the
comment goes on to state that "[i]n obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict,
the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's finan-
cial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the
position." Id.
92. ABA Formal Op. 02-426 (May 31, 2002).
93. Model Rule 1.4(b) states that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent rea-
sonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2010).
94. Subsection (b) of Model Rule 1.7 provides as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest un-
der paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to pro-
vide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in
the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writ-
ing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2010).
95. ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 92.
96. See supra note 93.
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fiduciaries, and family members; and the benefits and detri-
ments of using each, including relative costs.9 7
Model Rule 1.7(b) addresses resolution of a conflict of interest
where the representation of a client may be materially limited by a
personal interest of the lawyer. Under this rule, the representation
may proceed if the lawyer reasonably believes that she can render
competent and diligent representation to the client, and the client
gives informed written consent." The ABA Opinion holds lawyers
to a more exacting standard than Model Rule 1.7: "The ABA opin-
ion would attach a duty of disclosure regardless of whether 1.7
applies," something that is inconsistent with the commentary to
Model Rule 1.7, which "implies that only a Rule 1.7 case triggers
disclosure plus informed consent.""
In addition to the general rule on conflict of interest at Model
Rule 1.7, Model Rule 1.8 addresses specific rules relating to con-
flicts, including gifts to clients and business transactions with
clients.'o ABA Formal Opinion 02-426 notes specifically that ac-
cepting an appointment as a fiduciary falls into neither of these
categories.'1 However, the ABA Opinion states additionally that
while a lawyer fiduciary's appointment of himself or his firm as
counsel for the fiduciary does not constitute an inherent conflict of
interest, the overall compensation must be reasonable. 102 Whether
97. ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 92.
98. Supra note 94 (emphasis added).
99. Paula A. Monopoli, Drafting Attorneys as Fiduciaries: Fashioning an Optinat Ethical
Rule for Conflicts of Interest, 66 U. Prrr. L. REv. 411, 427 (2005). Professor Monopoli notes
that "all cases require 'discussion,' which the ABA opinion seems to use interchangeably
with disclosure." Id.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (c) (2010).
101. ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 92. The Opinion states:
Because a fiduciary performs services for compensation, accepting appointment as
fiduciary is not accepting a gift from a client who is unrelated to the lawyer, such as
Rule 1.8(c) prohibits. In addition, because appointing a fiduciary is not a "business
transaction with a client," Rule 1.8(a) does not apply to require the client to give her
signed, informed consent to the essential terms of the arrangement after receiving
the lawyer's written advice to seek independent legal advice.
Id.
102. See id. (citations omitted). With respect to fiduciary compensation, the ABA Opin-
ion notes:
Rule 1.5(a), which sets standards for determining the reasonableness of lawyers' fees,
does not in specific terms cover compensation that a lawyer may receive as a fiduciary.
Nevertheless, the fiduciary compensation the lawyer and his firm receive for his time
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a lawyer or firm, serving in both capacities, can be paid in full for
services rendered in both roles, differs from jurisdiction tojurisdic-
tion.
While the 2002 ABA Opinion voiced no inherent conflict when
a lawyer, serving as fiduciary, names himself or his firm as legal
counsel for the fiduciary, there are those that disagreed. Some saw
this situation as "replete with 'serious problems of conflict of inter-
est, overreaching, undue influence and solicitation.'10 Others
thought this situation suggested "a move away from client protec-
tion and toward a more arm's-length view of the attorney-client
relationship-from a fiduciary to a contractarian view of the
relationship."',o' Giving the lawyer the authority to determine if a
conflict of interest is consentable indicates a departure "from the
notion that the relationship of lawyer and client has certain immu-
table duties that may not be waived.,106 Rather than seeing "this
kind of conflict [as] a per se conflict," which would preclude the
practice, the ABA embraced a "more contractarian view of conflict
rules."07
B. Standards of Care as Default Rules
While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attor-
ney to serve as a fiduciary for a client, they do not address the
matter of incorporating exculpatory clauses into an instrument
drafted by the lawyer. Nor is the matter of exculpatory clauses ad-
dressed in the UPC, which defers to common law and to statutory
law by specifying that the definition of breach of fiduciary duty
should mirror that in the case of a trustee of an express trust."o'
and labor is relevant in determining what amount of legal fees is reasonable under
Rule 1.5(a).
Id. (citations omitted).
103. See id. at nn.18-20 and accompanying text.
104. E.g., Monopoli, supra note 99, at 438 (quoting Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., A Matter of
Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as Testamentary Fiduciary, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 275, 299
(1988)).
105. E.g., Monopoli, supra note 99, at 439.
106. Id. (concluding that "[t]he very financial benefit conferred poses a risk to the in-
dependent advice of the attorney, and the decision as to whether there is a conflict under
Rule 1.7 should not be discretionary"). See also supra text accompanying note 96.
107. Id.
108. The UPC provides that with respect to the probate of wills and administration of
estates, the personal representative "is a fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care
applicable to trustees as described by Section 7-302." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703(a)
(2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 38 (Supp. 2011). This personal representative "is liable to
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While exculpatory clauses are not raised in the UPC, it does set
forth a standard of care and expresses the notion that if a trustee
has special skills, it is the trustee's duty to use them. However, like
the UTC and the Restatement, the UPC makes these default rules,
stating:
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee
shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that
would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the proper-
ty of another, and if the trustee has special skills or is named
trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or ex-
pertise, he is under a duty to use those skills.o
One can argue that the phrase "except as otherwise provided by
the terms of the trust" modifies only the standard of care to which
the trustee is held, and not the provision relating to special skills.no
But, to echo a long-standing concern, should it follow that a lawyer
or professional trustee can be hired for his or her expertise, and
then can contract around the obligation to exercise it?"'
The UTC calls for exculpatory clauses to be fair, in light of the
circumstances in which they are used."2 It is unclear what consti-
tutes "fair." It is also somewhat troubling that under the UTC, the
fiduciary meets this burden of proving fairness if the settlor is rep-
resented by counsel, even if the trustee's form is used."3
Notwithstanding this, rationales have been proposed for profes-
sional trustees to use exculpatory clauses:
First, the settlor might fear frivolous litigation by disappointed
beneficiaries, litigation that will ultimately reduce the value of
the trust for all beneficiaries. Second, the settlor may believe
that trustee compensation will be less expensive if the trustee
is not bound by common-law fiduciary duties and their at-
tendant risk of litigation. Third, the settlor may face a
particular problem or set of problems for which fiduciary du-
ties present a sub-optimal solution. For instance, the settlor
interested persons for damage or loss resulting from breach of his fiduciary duty to the same
extent as a trustee of an express trust." § 3-712 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 160 (Supp. 2011).
109. § 7-302, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 507 (1998) (emphasis added).
110. This position is tenuous, however, because the components are contained in the
same sentence.
111. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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may desire that the trustee hold assets in trust that the trustee
is reluctant to accept."
While some reasons support exculpation from the settlor's per-
spective, a broad exculpatory clause that might read, "'the trustee
named in this instrument shall not be liable for the trustee's acts or
failure to act, except for willful misconduct or gross neglect,'" is
not the best way to address these concerns.'1 5 A settlor who fears
suits by beneficiaries can address this concern, for instance,
through the use of a no contest clause."6 If problematic assets are
at issue, a clause can be narrowly drawn in the form of a waiver that
relieves a trustee from liability should the value of those specific
assets subsequently decline." And if trustee compensation pur-
portedly is to be lower because of the inclusion of a broad
exculpatory clause, a settlor can insist on "two prices for two differ-
ent services: one commission for full-service trusteeship, and a
lower commission for an agreement that includes an exculpatory
clause.""" Having been offered the choice, if the settlor elects to go
with a reduced price, only then should the exculpatory clause be
enforceable."9 Professor Leslie posits that "requiring the trustee to
price the exculpatory clause would discourage trustees from rou-
tinely insisting on such clauses." 2 0
C. Reciprocal Agreements Between Fiduciaries
Just as a lawyer may draft an instrument naming himself as an
executor or trustee, a lawyer may draft an instrument naming him-
self as an attorney for the underlying estate. This can enable the
lawyer to "earn substantial legal fees during probate that more
than offset the tendency among practitioners to undercharge for
their work in planning estates and preparing the necessary imple-
menting documents."1 2 1 While in almost all jurisdictions the
114. Leslie, supra note 23, at 101-02.
115. Id. at 103 (quoting DRAFTING CALIFORNIA REVOCABLE LIVING TRUSTS, CAL. C.E.B.
§ 16.22 (J. Cohan ed., 4th ed. 2003)).
116. See id. at 102.
117. See id. at 102-03.
118. Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
119. Cf id. Professor Leslie notes that "a large price differential is likely to induce the
settlor to obtain independent advice about the rights she gives up when she agrees to the
exculpatory clause." Id.
120. Id.
121. Johnston, supra note 84, at 87.
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designation that a particular lawyer or law firm be retained by the
executor is not binding, in most cases the lawyer who drafts the
estate plan is retained by the named trustee or executor. ' The
practice of retaining the services of the lawyer who drafted the un-
derlying instrument for any legal work associated with the estate or
trust administration is widespread, especially when a corporate fi-
duciary is named as executor or trustee. 2 3
This practice of retaining the lawyer who drafted an instrument
for the provision of legal services, or routinely calling on the same
lawyer who suggested retaining the corporate trustee, has been de-
scribed as
a "gentleman's agreement" between financial institutions and
the bar, as "reciprocal back scratching," as a "symbiotic rela-
tionship," and, less generously, as a "conspiracy" between
corporate executors and lawyers to exploit the client by
recommending that the testator name a bank as executor in
exchange for assurance that the executor, once approved, will
retain the attorney to assist in the probate of the testator's es-
tate.124
Since revisions to the Model Rules acknowledge and approve of
reciprocal agreements between lawyers and non-lawyers, provided
that these agreements are not exclusive and the arrangements are
disclosed to clients, 2 it stands to reason that these relationships
will continue, if not flourish. Legal ethics is not the avenue to con-
trol this "extensive practice" because banks, which do not come
under the purview of rules that regulate lawyers' conduct, often
implement these policies.'2 6 This, in and of itself, seems somewhat
ineffective as to lawyer regulation, because the lawyer's role is gov-
erned by conflict of interest rules that call for resolution based on
an individual lawyer's belief that competent representation can be
122. See id. at 105-06.
123. Cf id. at 115 (noting that the practice is widespread when a bank is named as ex-
ecutor or trustee, and that, "in probating a testator's estate, legal services are virtually always
needed because of the strict application of laws relating to unauthorized practice of law,
which preclude corporate fiduciaries from handling matters processed through the probate
court system"). Id. (footnote omitted).
124. Id. (footnotes omitted).
125. See MoDEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(b)(4) (2010).
126. SeeJohnston, supra note 84, at 119.
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rendered. It has been suggested that legislation should govern this
type of activity.
D. Revisions to the Uniform Probate Code
In the recent revisions to the UPC, fiduciary duties continue to
be recognized as default provisions, with deference being given to
common law and statutory law to set applicable standards. 2 8 Draft-
ers of the revisions should have weighed in on a fiduciary's use of
exculpation, or examined whether fiduciary duties should be im-
mutable rules, although this might have been viewed as beyond the
scope of their mandate. However, rather than taking an affirmative
position that would address a move toward embracing prudence
mandates, no UPC revisions were made in this regard.
Perhaps the drafters of the revisions were comfortable with the
default nature of fiduciary duties. Perhaps the drafters of the
revisions were comfortable with the UTC's and Restatement's
condemnation of exculpation for breach of trust committed in bad
faith or with (reckless) indifference, and placing the burden on
the trustee to prove an exculpatory term is fair and its terms ade-
quately communicated to the client. However, even if the drafters
of the revisions chose to endorse these provisions through inac-
tion, it seems they should have seized the opportunity to weigh in
on the nature of fiduciary duties and the practice of exculpation.
Considering the ethical obligations and the responsibilities that
underlie fiduciary duties, the drafters of the UPC revisions should
have directly addressed these fundamental obligations and the use
of exculpatory provisions. Since the default nature of fiduciary du-
ties was left intact, the revisions should have voiced a position on
whether the cutoff should be just shy of bad faith and indifference,
with fairness being the objective. Weighing public policy concerns,
client protection, and the responsibilities associated with fiduciary
duties, the standard of prudence should not so easily be aban-
doned.
127. See id. (noting that legislation must govern both banking institutions and members
of the bar). At least one jurisdiction has enacted legislation that gives the principal benefi-
ciaries the opportunity to select attorneys to represent the named trustee or executor. See id.
at 120-21 (discussing Wisconsin's unique legislation that permits the beneficiaries to select
their representative).
128. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
With some exceptions, exculpatory clauses that absolve a fiduci-
ary from liability for breach of trust are widely used. While some
jurisdictions condemn exculpatory clauses as public policy viola-
tions, the UTC and the Restatement acknowledge their use, while
precluding exculpation for bad faith, intentional misconduct, or
(reckless) indifference. The new UPC, rather than taking a defini-
tive position on fiduciary duty status and the use of exculpatory
clauses, chose to continue to defer to other law and regard fiduci-
ary duties as default provisions rather than majoritarian immutable
rules. Given this practice, and given that (1) representation by
counsel may satisfy the "fairness" requirement the use of exculpa-
tion clauses calls for; (2) lawyers are permitted to offer themselves
for fiduciary roles; and (3) lawyers are permitted to work in tan-
dem with non-lawyer professional trustees, more direction would
have been welcome. The duty to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary has been characterized as the most fun-
damental of the fiduciary duties. The revisions to the UPC should
have underscored this requirement by affirmatively recognizing
that there are some duties which should not be contracted around.
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